Mesa County District Court cases 96 DR 372 and 96 JV 180

David E. Wilkenson vs. Colorado: A Saga of Criminal Judicial Behavior In Family Courts — Part 1

by John R. Wilkenson


(NOTE: Article 2, Section 10 of the Colorado Constitution says in pertinent part: “Freedom of speech and press…every person shall be free to speak, write or publish whatever he will on any subject, ... and in all suits and prosecutions of libel the truth thereof may be given in evidence, and the jury, under the direction of the court, shall determine the law and the fact.” The following is political speech aimed at exposing judicial criminals and correcting a serious systemic problem. While the material is the author’s 1st-Amendment-protected opinion, it is also the truth, so help me God. The "gory behavioral details" of a hideously acrimonious divorce involving the manipulations of two profoundly dysfunctional families are set forth in the January 28, 2002 edition of Common Sense and in Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 to that pamphlet.)

This is a sad-but-true story about what happens when judges ignore procedural due process and the rule of law, and commit crimes against the litigants who appear in family courts before them. It is also a story about how the entire “brotherhood-of-divorce-industry-cronies1 ” judicial system itself protects judges who commit crimes. It is a story of pervasive and pandemic criminal judicial behavior, especially in family courts.

Other efforts have been made to tell this story, perhaps most notably, the documentary titled, “Divorce Corp: The Divorce Industry Exposed”, directed by Joseph Sorge, and produced by Philip Sternberg and James D. Scurlock. But your humble webmaster sincerely believes, as a person who had a brother go through this hell, and as a person who has had his own immediate and extended families disgraced and/or destroyed2 by the various hateful manipulations and lies perpetrated by various member of his family, he is in a unique position to tell the story from the viewpoint of an insider and first-hand witness.

In a nutshell, the mechanics of the situation were as follows:

Seriously mentally ill, domestically violent alcoholic woman endangers her husband and children. When husband goes to the “system” seeking intervention, gender feminists within the system try to destroy husband.

Various lies told by my brother Daniel and my sister Anita caused various Human Services employees and various Mesa County District Court employees to make horribly wrong and potentially career-ending mistakes. Instead of just following the rules, admitting their mistakes and correcting the situation, the judicial officers in question, Nicholas Massaro (“Massaro”), Jane Westbrook (“Westbrook”) and Cynthia Cyphers (“Cyphers”) completely ignored both Colorado and United States constitutions and made various illegal (jurisdictionless legal-nullity) orders. Those lawless manipulations didn’t work out as planned, so the “Three Criminal Stooges” committed criminal acts (knowingly falsifying the register of actions, the record on appeal, and generating various phony documents) trying to cover up their illegal behavior. In my opinion, logic would seem to dictate that Mesa County Attorney, Maurice “Lyle” Dechant, was among the accessories (at minimum after the fact) to the various judicial crimes.

To make the story telling easier and cleared, I will sometimes intersperse the terms “Father” (meaning David E. Wilkenson), “Mother” (meaning his seriously borderline alcohonic ex-wife, Johannah), “Boys” (meaning Ben and Toby Wilkenson), where appropriate. To save space and help clarify the flow of information, I will also insert brief statements of fact that are not written in the style of the overall narrative.

David has one other child, Brandon James Wilkenson, who is several years older than Ben and Toby, and who doesn’t play a large part in the story. Brandon is the half-brother of Ben and Toby. Brandon is 26 years old. Ben is 20, and Toby will be 19 on February 27, 2014.


This saga of judicial criminality and systemic cover up began in earnest with my brother David (“Father”) marrying (and having two sons3 with) an alcoholic English-citizen woman with wealthy parents, a serious borderline personality disorder and four DUI charges, three of which were injury accidents. One of those DUI injury accidents involved a police car and injuries to police officers. In that incident, Mother fled the country to avoid prosecution in the United States. Over the years, Mother drove drunk many times without getting caught.

Father and Mother were living on Glade Park with Boys and their half brothers, Brandon Wilkenson (same father, different mother) and Tom Sowerby (same mother, different father).

Drunk mentally ill Mother with multiple DUI convictions wrecked car, beat out windows in a drunken rage and lied Father about what had happened. One-year-old Toby was in the car while Mother beat out the windows with a tire iron.

Father told Mother he was going to see intervention for the safety of the family.

Mother went to domestic shelter, lied to staff about what was going on, and received ostensibly misandristic staff’s help in obtaining an ex parte Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and filing for divorce from falsely-alleged-as-violent husband.

Father hired a lawyer, Clayton Tipping, who filed a motion for temporary interim custody under Title 14 to remove Boys from Mother’s care and place them in custody of Social Services. Father’s motion was granted by the presiding judge, Nicholas “Nick” Massaro. Children were placed with Father’s mother and father by Social Services on a Friday night.

About 6:30 the following Saturday morning, Father’s sister, Anita, called Social Services, and lied to them about our mother and father, claiming they were physically abusive, and that our father was sexually abusive.

At about 9:30 a.m., Social Services removed Boys from Father’s parents’ house and placed them in my lying brother Daniel’s house. Daniel (who has had several pychotic episodes) lasted for only one week as a foster parent, then Social Services placed Boys in various foster homes

On the Monday after the Saturday placement of Boys at my lying brother Daniel’s house was the Title 19 shelter hearing in Mesa County District Court (MCDC) where presiding MCDC Judge Amanda Bailey (filling in for previously committed Judge Nick Massaro) found Boys to be dependent and neglected. At that Title 19 shelter hearing, then-Assistant Mesa County Attorney, now MCDC judge), Valerie Robison, agreed to file a Dependency and Neglect (D & N) petition forthwith.

It is crucial to understand that a Title 14 dissolution of marriage and child custody case is a civil action which is styled “Father v. Mother” as the opposing parties. A Title 19 case is a quasi-criminal action which is styled “State of Colorado v. Father and Mother” as the opposing parties.

(IMPORTANT NOTE: In Colorado, Colorado Revised Statutes (C.R.S.) §19-1-104(6) expressly states that in and all situations where there is already an ongoing prior pending Title 14 dissolution of marriage (“DR”) and child custody case involving the same children, a Title 19 juvenile (“JV”) D & N case may not be initiated. The reason for this legislative statutory prohibition of jurisdiction is precisely because experience has taught the various government players that in extremely acrimonious divorces, the parties routinely lie and try to manipulate the various government players into taking their side against the opposing party. See also Everett v. Barry.)

Father hired lawyer, Rebecca Casey, a specialist in Title 19 D & N cases. The MCDC appointed lawyer Catherine Burkey for Mother because a D & N case is quasi-criminal.

Valerie Robison filed a D & N petition asking for multiple evaluations of both parents. The court ordered the evaluations. The court also ordered treatment plans as a result of what the evaluations showed. Both parents were ordered to attend parenting classes.

All parents who are the respondents to a D & N petition are required to attend parenting classes.

Both Father and Mother attended parenting classes.

Dave was never ordered to undergo any treatment as a result of the court-ordered evaluations.

(A D & N case lasts for 6 months and can be extended for good cause shown.) Dave attended parenting classes, as did Johannah during that time.

There was a restraining order for violent Mother to stay away from nonviolent Father.

At the end of the first six months, the case was extended because Mother had borrowed a car and driven up to Father’s home on Glade Park without a driver’s license, while under probation for driving, and admitting that she had been drinking. Mother had left the Boys with an unauthorized and unknown party. As a result of this behavior, Valerie Robison entered a motion to give Father sole custody of the Boys. (Custody of Brandon was never at issue, because Mother was not Brandon’s mother. Tom Sowerby’s father, a British businessman, came over from England, and the MCDC allowed Mr. Sowerby to return to England with his son, Tom. A short time later, the English courts awarded sole custody of Tom to Mr. Sowerby.)

As a result of this behavior, Valerie Robison entered a motion to give Dave sole custody of the boys.

Within a week or so, Valerie Robison withdrew her motion – allegedly “improvidently” made – to give Dave sole custody, falsely stating that there was no restraining order in effect at the time of the incident. Obviously, Ms. Robison lied.

Within a few weeks, Valerie Robison extended the illegal Title 19 D & N case for six more months, citing Mother’s behavior and the fact that Father carried a gun — legally, mind you — in the car. Although various misandristic leftists and various anti-gun “touchy feelies” didn’t approve of Father carrying a gun in his car for self-defense — Glade Park is an isolated rural area where people have been assaulted and/or murdered — nobody ever ordered Father not to carry a gun in his car.

Mother’s lawyer, Catherine Burkey filed a motion for a finding of child support in the legal-nullity Title 19 JV case. Valerie Robison filed an objection and motion to clarify.

Dave stopped using the services of attorney Rebecca Casey at that point.

On 4/10/97, Magistrate Jane Westbrook just went ahead and held a child support hearing in the JV case without the prosecuting petitioner (Mesa County) being present.

Westbrook put a number amount on the child support Father was supposed to pay based on what she thought was Father’s income combined with the percentage of parents’ child support obligation Father was supposed to pay. Westbrook illegally assessed 100% of the obligation against Father, and 0% against Mother, despite the fact Father and Mother had exactly equal 50/50 parenting time and exactly equal 50/50 shared custody of the Boys.

(NOTE: In Colorado, in a 50/50 situation, the total child support obligation is calculated based on the combined total of both parents’ incomes. Then, the percentage of that total obligation assigned to each parent is based on the relative income of one parent compared to the other. It is also important to note at this point that English-citizen Mother’s wealthy parents gave her money to live on wherever in the world she decided to live. They just wanted their problematic daughter out of their high-society hair. Of course, Mother lied to Westbrook and claimed she was penniless. Westbrook, having misandristic tendencies anyway, had already been successfully spun by the local misandristic gender-feminist social services establishment who were helping the lying Mother despite the fact gender-biased Domestic Violence Shelter personnel already had an established record of Mother’s drunken violence towards Father.)

From a rule-of-law perspective of Colorado law, Father and Mother should have each been assessed 50% of the child support obligation. Ignoring for a moment the blatant jurisdictionless illegality of the Title 19 JV case, in making her illegal finding of child support obligation, Westbrook clearly (and very deliberately) violated In re Marriage of Pote, 847 P.2d 246 (Colo.Ct.App. 1993) and In Re Marriage of Redford, 776 P.2d 1149 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989). (See also Colorado's Child Support Obligation Worksheet for shared parenting.)

Westbrook issued a minute order for Dave to pay $705 per month retroactive to 10/1/96. This was a further violation of C.R.S. §19-1-104(6).

Lawyer Stuart Jones had filed a notice of entry of appearance in the Title 14 DR case. As previously noted, Mother’s lawyer, Catherine Burkey, had filed a motion to determine child support in the illegal Title 19 JV case. Stuart Jones filed a motion to withdraw from the Title 14 DR case (he was never in the Title 19 JV case) on 4/28/97, based on Westbrook’s illegal order in the illegal Title 19 case determining child support.

On 4/19/97 Dave filed a motion for Westbrook to reconsider her 4/10/97 child support finding.

On 5/06/97 Westbrook illegally issued her child support order in the legal-nullity Title 19 JV case.

On 5/19/97, Dave received the denial of his 4/19/97 motion to reconsider the 4/10/97 child support finding.

On 5/22/97, Westbrook signed an order terminating the Title 19 JV case along with all orders in that case, and certifying the custody orders to the Title 14 DR case, parroting the language of C.R.Juv.P Rule 4(a).

On 5/29/97 Dave filed a motion in the JV case for review of the magistrate's findings of child support by the district court judge.

On 6/10/97, in the Title 14 DR case, Westbrook granted Stuart Jones’s motion to withdraw. On that very same day (6/10/97), in the Title 14 DR case, Westbrook allegedly make an order for payover of Title 19 JV child support to the Title 14 DR case. Father says that alleged order (if it exists) is fraudulent. Father says he never received a copy of that order, he can’t get a copy of that order, and the record of that fraudulently alleged order has been destroyed ostensibly to protect Westbrook from facing potential criminal charges. On 5/29/97, Father had filed a C.R.Civ.P. Rule 6(e)(2) motion in the Title 19 JV case to review Magistrate’s (Westbrook’s) illegal finding of child support obligation in the illegal Title 19 JV case. Westbrook’s illegal child support order was dated 5/6/97. Massaro’s denial of Father’s motion to review the order didn’t occur until 7/23/97. Obviously, Westbrook’s 6/10/97 pay-over order was a predated criminal fraud. Additionally, jurisdiction over the child support finding was transferred to Massaro with Father’s 5/29/97 motion to review.

In late June, while Westbrook’s illegal support order was still under Rule 6(e)(2) review, Burkey perpetrated a fraud (my opinion) against the court by falsely alleging that the illegal support order was valid, due and payable in the Title 14 DR case.

In the first part of July, Burkey’s motion for contempt citation was granted by Magistrate Cynthia Cyphers. Ostensibly, Burkey had gone magistrate shopping (my opinion) because Westbrook already knew that her illegal order was under Rule 6(e)(2) review, and likely would not have granted a contempt citation.

Nothing that was in the Title 19 JV case was in the record of the Title 14 DR case to alert Cyphers as to the nature of Burkey’s fraudulent highly unethical (my opinion) manipulations.

On 7/11/97, Father was served with the contempt citation.

On 7/23/97 Massaro denied Dave's motion for review of the magistrate's child support findings.

On 7/28/97 Father filed four verified motions: 1) for Rule 11 sanctions against Burkey, 2) to dismiss contempt citation, 3) to reconsider Cypher’s order for contempt citation and quash summons, and 4) Rule 6(e)(2) motion for review of Cypher’s order issuing contempt citation. (NOTE: So, very obviously, Father had in fact “appeared” before the MCDC in writing regarding the fraudulent contempt citation, although he was arrested for allegedly failing to appear.)

Having received no word about the disposition of his pending four motions, on 8/13/97 at about 9:00 a.m., Father filed a Rule 97 motion to disqualify Westbrook and Cyphers for bias.

On 8/13/97 at about 1:30 p.m., Cyphers held a hearing on the contempt citation. Father, being out of town on an HVAC emergency, was not present at that hearing. Cyphers reset the contempt hearing for 8/22/97.

On 8/15/97, Westbrook signed an arrest warrant “for Magistrate Cyphers” ordering the arrest of Dave for failure to appear. The date of that order was criminally fraudulently predated to 8/13/97 in the register of actions, ostensibly by Westbrook, the signer of the criminally fraudulent document. In the criminally falsified register of action, the sequence of the three crucial events are presented as: 1) the 8/13/97 contempt hearing, 2) the 8/15/97 arrest warrant fraudulently dated 8/13/97, and 3) the 8/13/97 motion to disqualify Westbrook and Cyphers for bias. The chronologically correct sequence of those three events is: 1) the 8/13/97 9:00 a.m. Rule 97 Motion to disqualify Westbrook and Cyphers for bias, 2) the 8/13/97 1:30 p.m. contempt hearing, and 3) the illegal 8/15/97 arrest warrant criminally fraudulently predated to 8/13/97. Part of the reason the correct chronological sequence is so important is because, in pertinent part, C.R.Civ.P. Rule 97 says: “Upon the filing by a party of such a motion, all proceedings shall be suspended until a ruling is made thereon.” Dave's Rule 97 motion to disqualify judges was not ruled on until 9/2/97, when it was denied by Cyphers and Westbrook. On 9/10/97, Dave filed a Rule 6(e)(2) motion for review of the magistrates' denial by the district court judge. That motion was denied on 10/30/97 by Massaro. So, to recap, momentarily ignoring, arguendo, the blatant and deliberate illegality of the support order Dave was allegedly in contempt of, Rule 97 forbid the arrest of Dave until 10/30/97. Regardless of, and in direct violation of, the law, Dave was unconstitutionally arrested on 8/22/97, with bond being set at $7,755 cash only.

On 8/26/97, Dave had an advisement hearing in front of Cyphers. At that hearing, Cyphers said she knew nothing about Dave's five pending motions. Cyphers had the record of the Title 14 DR case right in front of her, and said the five pending motions were not in the record.

Cyphers falsified the register of actions and the court record by predating her denial of Dave's motion to 1) reconsider Cyphers order to issue the contempt citation and quash summons, and 2) dismiss the contempt citation. Cyphers fraudulently predated her denials to 8/25/97 (the day before Cyphers told Dave at his 8/26/97 advisement hearing that she didn't know anything about those motions.)

On 8/26/97, Dave filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in both state and federal courts.

Dave was kept in jail for 18 days -- (any false imprisonment over 12 days is a felony) -- then released on 9/11/97.

On 9/12/97, Cyphers ruled that the habeas petition was moot because Dave had already been released on his signature on a personal pecognisance bond. Obviously, Cyphers backed down on her $7,755 amount.

On 12/15/97 Massaro began a 3-day custody hearing, which ended at 4:30 p.m. on 12/17/97. During that hearing, Father was prohibited from entering into evidence any testimony or other evidence having to do with the Title 19 JV case. Father introduced a 180-page deposition by Paul Sowerby (Tom Sowerby’s father) about Mother’s bizarre behavior while he was married to her in England. Massaro said he would read that deposition, but obviously did not, because on the very next morning (12/18/97) Massaro issued his final custody and parenting time order, which had been completed before 10 a.m.. It would have been impossible to both read the 180-page deposition and prepare the final custody and parenting time order in the very short time available.

Dave was prohibited from entering into evidence any testimony or evidence having to do with the legal-nullity Title 19 JV case because of the alleged confidentiality of the legal-nullity Title 19 JV case.

On 12/18/97 Massaro issued his final custody and parenting time order, which had been completed before 10:00 a.m. when the hearing had only been terminated a few hours earlier on the afternoon of 12/17/97.

Dave timely appealed Massaro's 12/18/97 Final Custody and Parenting Time Order.

On 4/10/98, Burkey filed a motion for permission for Mother to leave the MCDC’s jurisdiction and relocate to England with Boys.

Johannah had pled guilty to a DUI charge on 8/27/96. She was required to undergo an alcohol evaluation. She was sentenced to $500 fine ($200 of it suspended), pay all costs, 120 days in jail (50 days suspended), 70 hours of community service, 40 hours of alcohol abuse therapy, and 15 months of probation. Johannah was in violation of probation in March of 1998. From the record of Johannah's DUI case, there is no way of knowing when Judge Art Smith became apprised of the probation violation because the record of Johannah's DUI case has been falsified, with crucial parts of the record missing. Presumably, these abuse-of-public-records crimes were either perpetrated and/or orchestrated by Massaro. Johannah was represented in her DUI case by a public defender.

On 6/16/98, Massaro set a hearing for 8/26/98 to hear that motion

On 7/31/98, Father filed a petition for a writ of prohibition with the Colorado Supreme Court (CSC) to stop Massaro from holding a hearing to allow Mother to relocate with Boys to England in the middle of an ongoing pending appeal.

On 8/21/98 the CSC denied Father’s petition for a writ of prohibition with the single substantive word, “denied”.

On 8/24/98 Father filed an emergency petition for a temporary restraining order in the U.S. District Court for Colorado, the Honorable Judge Richard P. Matsch presiding. Judge Matsch denied Father’s request for an emergency TRO saying that he couldn’t interfere with state court business. But Judge Matsch also said he couldn’t see why the Colorado Supreme Court had denied Father’s petition for a writ of prohibition under the circumstances, so he issued summonses in a civil rights case in the event Massaro would actually dare to allow Mother and Boys to leave the United States in the middle of an ongoing appeal.

On 8/26/98, despite the fact the Colorado Court of Appeals (CCApp) had jurisdiction over the Title 14 DR case under appeal, on 8/26/98 Massaro (in direct violation of Molitor v. Anderson, No. 89SC13, 795 P.2d 266 (1990) and McGonigle v. McGonigle, 112 Colo. 569, 151 P.2d 977 (1944)), held a hearing and allowed Mother to relocate with Boys to England. At that hearing, Massaro illegally modified his final custody and parenting time order while it was already under ongoing pending appeal. Massaro’s criminal (my opinion) behavior was in direct blatant violation of Molitor, because the CCApp already had jurisdiction over the case being appealed.

The Colorado Court of Appeals did not deny Father’s appeal of Massaro’s final custody and parenting time order until 1/6/99.

On 1/14/99 Father filed an objection and motion to clarify with the Colorado Court of Appeals.

On 6/14/99 the Colorado Court of Appeals denied Father’s Motion to Clarify.

On 6/22/99 Father petitioned the Colorado Court of Appeals for a rehearing.

On 7/02/99 the Colorado Court of Appeals denied Father’s motion for a rehearing.

On 9/16/99 Father filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Colorado Supreme Court.

On 12/30/99 the CSC denied Father’s petition for a writ of certiorari with the single substantive word, “denied”.

On 1/5/2000 Father filed a motion in the Colorado Court of Appeals for stay of mandate.

On 1/31/2000 the Colorado Court of Appeals denied Father’s motion for stay of mandate.

So, it was over 17 months after Massaro illegally let Mother leave the United States with Boys that the disposition of Father’s appeal (of Massaro’s 12/18/98 final custody and parenting time order) became final.

Basically, the CCApp allowed Massaro to alter his 12/18/98 order more than 17 months before any such modification could possibly have been theoretically legal.

Basically, Massaro held the Colorado judiciary hostage and forced the CCApp to act as accessory-after-the-fact in his crimes by letting Mother untimely leave the United States (and the enforcement jurisdiction of the Colorado judiciary) with Boys.

The alternative would have been a multi-million dollar class action lawsuit against Colorado by world-class attorneys. So, at the very instant that Colorado’s judiciary allowed Massaro to get away with his blatant criminality of letting Mother and the Boys relocate to England, the Colorado judiciary became not only an accessory after the fact to Massaro’s crimes, but also became an interested/biased party to the case. At that point, all due process and rule of law was suspended by the official-but-unspoken policy of the Colorado Supreme Court to criminally violate Father’s state and federal constitutional rights.

At the time the Colorado judiciary allowed Massaro to get away with illegally letting Johannah and the boys relocated to England, the Colorado judiciary became an accessory after the fact to Massaro's crimes and an interested party to the case. At that point, all due process and rule of law was suspended by the official-but-unspoken policy of the Colorado Supreme Court.

Since Johannah's relocation to England, at no point in time has she ever been in compliance with Massaro's Final Custody and Parenting Time Order. Since Johannah's relocation to England, she has disallowed any and all contact between Ben and Toby and their father as well as with their half-brother Brandon Wilkenson.

On 1/22/01 Dave filed a motion for a contempt citation based on Johannah's failure to obey Massaro's final custody and parenting time order. That motion was granted by the MCDC, and a hearing was held on 3/14/01. Upon Johannah's failure to appear at that hearing, and arrest warrant for Johannah was issued.

On 6/15/01, Dave filed a motion to modify custody based on Johannah's noncompliance with the final custody and parenting time order and failure to appear at the contempt hearing [see Holland v. Holland, 150 Colo. 442, 373 P 2d 523 (1962)].

On 8/16/01 Westbrook denied Dave's 6/15/01 motion to modify custody.

On 11/5/01 Dave filed an objection and motion to reconsider and re-entry of Father's 6/15/01 motion to modify custody with supporting affidavit.

On 12/24/01, Dave filed a Rule 6(e)(2) motion for review of Westbrook's 12/10/01 denial of Father's 11/5/01 objection and re-entry of motion to modify.

On 1/22/02 Dave filed another motion for contempt citation based on Johannah's continued deliberate disobedience of the FCPTO. That motion was granted by Cyphers. At the 3/14/02 hearing on the contempt citation, Johannah again failed to appear, and Cyphers issued an arrest warrant for Johannah. At that hearing, Dave asked Cyphers how long the arrest warrants would remain in effect. Cyphers told Dave the arrest warrants would remain in effect indefinitely until Johannah appeared.

On 3.19/02 Massaro denied Dave's Rule 6(e)(2) motion for review of Westbrook's 12/10/01 denial.

On 4/8/02 Dave filed a motion to reconsider Massaro's 3/19/02 denial of Father's 12/24/01 motion for review of Westbrook's 8/16/01 denial of Father's 6/15/01 motion to modify custody.

On 5/28/02 Massaro denied Father's 4/8/02 motion to reconsider.

On 6/10/02 Dave filed a notice of appeal.

On 10/18/02 Dave filed his opening brief in the Colorado Court of Appeals. The MCDC record has been falsified by the removal of that brief from the MCDC record.

On 2/19/03 Dave filed an amended opening brief.

On 4/28/03 the Colorado Court of Appeals denied Dave's appeal.

On 6/30/03 Dave petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.

On 11/5/03 the Colorado Supreme Court denied Dave's 6/30/03 petition for a writ of certiorari.

On 11/12/02 Johannah filed a verified entry of support judgment. That document is not in the register of action or the record on appeal.

On 11/20/02 Johannah filed an affidavit of arrearages alleging that Dave owes on the 5/6/97 child support order.

On 12/02/02 Dave filed a verified motion to strike Johannah's 11/12/02 and 11/20/02 documents.

On 1/16/03 Westbrook denied Dave's 12/02/02 motion to strike.

On 1/31/03 Dave filed a verified motion to reconsider, and a Rule 6(e)(2) motion for the judge to review Westbrook's 1/16/03 denial.

On 4/10/03 Massaro denied Dave's 1/31/03 Rule 6(e)(2) motion for review.

On 4/21/03 Dave filed a verified motion for Massaro to reconsider his 4/10/03 denial.

On 4/30/03 Stuart Jones reappeared in the case and filed a motion for an order to require child support payments to be administered through the Colorado Family Support Registry.

On 5/5/03 Westbrook granted Stuart Jones's 4/30/03 motion.

On 5/6/03 Dave filed a verified Rule 97 motion to disqualify Westbrook for bias.

On 5/9/03 Westbrook denied Father's 5/6/03 Rule 97 motion.

On 5/12/03 Father filed an objection and a verified Rule 6(e)(2) motion to review Westbrook's 5/5/03 granting of Stuart Jones's 4/30/03 motion. Massaro never ruled on that motion.

On 5/29/03 Dave filed a verified motion to reconsider Westbrook's 5/9/03 denial of Father's 5/6/03 motion to disqualify.

On 6/13/03 Westbrook denied Dave's 5/29/03 motion to reconsider and assessed attorney fees against him in direct violation of C.R.S. 13-17-102(6).

On 6/30/03 Dave filed a notice of appeal on the illegal child support issue.

On 6/30/03 Dave filed a verified Rule 97 motion and afidavit to recuse Massaro for bias.

On 7/30/03 Massaro denied Dave's 6/30/03 Rule 97 motion to recuse.

On 8/6/03 Dave filed an objection and motion to reconsider Massaro's 7/30/03 denial.

On 8/9/03 Massaro denied Dave's 8/6/03 motion to reconsider.

On 9/4/03 Dave filed a CAR Rule 21 petition for writ of mandamus with the Colorado Supreme Court. That document was removed from the court record, thus falsifying the court record.

On 9/17/03 the Colorado Supreme Court denied Dave's 9/4/03 petition for writ of mandamus.

On 9/17/03 Dave filed his opening brief in the Colorado Court of Appeals regarding the illegal child support order, Case No. 03-CA-1281.

From 12/4/03 until 4/23/10 everything is missing from the MDCD court record. At least fifteen documents are missing.

At this point in time, Johannah's actions have dispositively proven to be against the best interests of Ben and Toby, because the best interests of Ben and Toby were ostensibly (although illegally) embodied in Massaro's final custody and parenting time order. Therefore, all the Colorado judiciaries rulings, orders, and denials leaving the custody of Ben and Toby with Johannah have proven beyond all remotely reasonable doubt to be directly opposed to Colorado's best-interest-of-the-child standard and Colorado public policy for handling these types of cases.

To this day, the Colorado judiciaries continue to cover up this fact to avoid its extreme and inexcusable anti-rule-of-law embarrassment.

It is your humble webmaster's constitutionally protected opinion that Mother's lawyer, Catherine Burkey, brokered a bribery deal between Mother's wealthy parents and MCDC Judge Nicholas Massaro. It's the only thing that seems to make logical sense out of such a prolonged and extreme pattern of blatant and felonius judicial criminality.

Under construction . . .

Because the Title 14 case (96 DR 372) was already active and involved the same children, in addition to which the children were at the time in the temporary custody of the Mesa County Department of Human Services (MCDHS) per Court order, under the circumstances, the creation of a Title 19 case (96 JV 180) was expressly prohibited by, C.R.S. 19-1-104(6)4, C.R.S. 19-3-308, C.R.S. 19-3-501, C.R.S. 19-3-505 and C.R.Juv.P. Rule 4.4(a), as well as being completely in violation of the on-point holding in Everett v. Barry5, 127 Colo. 34, 252 P 2d 826 (1953). The Title 19 case was created by Mesa County District Court (MCDC) Judge Nicholas R. Massaro, Jr. in prima facie violation of an express legislative prohibition of jurisdiction. It was a prima facie jurisdictionless legal-nullity ab initio (aka "from the beginning"), which means any orders made in that case are themselves jurisdictionless legal nullities for the purposes of Ex Parte Fisk, 113 US 713 (1885), and Thrap v People, 192 Colo. 341, 558 P2d 576 (1977) which holds that "one cannot be convicted of contempt for respectfully declining to comply with an order which is beyond the court's authority." David was never under any obligation to obey the illegal nullity orders. See also Ex Parte Rowland, 104 U.S. 604 (1881), Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wallace) 163 163 (1873), Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339 (1879), Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371 (1879), Ex parte Parks, 93 U. S. 18 (1876), Ex Parte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 Howard) 307 (1855), Ex Parte Kearney, 20 U.S. (7 Wheaton) 38 (1822), Ex Parte Bollman and Ex Parte Swartwout, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807).

In Colorado, whether you are involved in a civil case or a criminal case, "all [Rule 12 — JRW] defenses and objections not entered are deemed waived," see Mora v. People, 172 Colo. 261, 472 P.2d 142 (1970) and County Comm'rs v. District Court, 172 Colo. 311, 472 P.2d 128 (1970). Additionally, in the case of Simmons v. United States - 390 U.S. 377 (1968), the U.S. Supreme Court held, "It is intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another." Accordingly, David refused to waive his legal right to have the court procedures obey the relevant law in his case.

Following are most, if not all, of the documents David Wilkenson filed in the Mesa County District Court in two cases, the domestic (Title 14) case 96 DR 372 and the jurisdictionless legal-nullity case 96 JV 180:


2014-02-11 Mandate of the Colorado Court of Appeals (dismissing David E. Wilkenson's appeal with prejudice.

Under construction . . .


1. “When we began making our documentary film in 2011 we had no idea we were about to uncover the last vestige of lawlessness in America. Family courts are a dark corner of the judicial system where fiefdoms and tyrants still thrive, where the supreme law of the land is routinely ignored, where children are taken hostage for profit, and where lives are destroyed as a matter of course. We knew we had to shine a light on these injustices. We hope that our movie and book do just that and point the way to a better path.” ~ Divorce Corp: The Divorce Industry Exposed

2. The author’s immediate family consists of five siblings, three boys (born first: John Raymond, born third: David Earl, and born fourth: Daniel Allen) and two girls (born second: Anita Lea and born fifth: Susan Marie). #2, #4 and #5 are estranged from #1 and #3. The author is the firstborn child. As the oldest child, the author is intimately familiar with the upbringing of all five siblings. Our parents are deceased. All five siblings were raised better than the behavior of #2, #4 and #5 in this story would indicate.

3. Ben and Toby Wilkenson.

4. "(6) When the juvenile court maintains jurisdiction in a case involving a child who is dependent or neglected and no child custody action or action for the allocation of parental responsibilities concerning the same child is pending in a district court in this state (emphasis added), upon the petition of a party to the dependency or neglect case, the juvenile court may enter an order allocating parental responsibilities and addressing parenting time and child support matters. The parent or person other than a parent with whom the child resides the majority of the time pursuant to the juvenile court's order shall file a certified copy of the order in the district court in the county where the child is permanently resident. Such order shall be treated in the district court as any other decree issued in a proceeding concerning the allocation of parental responsibilities."

5. Petition essential for jurisdiction. Without a petition in writing setting forth all the facts concerning what constitutes the child a dependent and verified by the affidavit of the petitioner, a juvenile court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter. Kearney v. Blue, 134 Colo. 217, 301 P.2d 515 (1956).

Petitioner should not file a petition without knowledge of facts justifying belief of dependency and, when the petition is filed, should see that evidence is presented supporting it. Peterson v. Schwartzmann, 116 Colo. 235, 179 P.2d 662 (1947).

Issue to be resolved in dependency proceeding. In a dependency proceeding the question to be resolved is not the comparative rights of different claimants of custody, but solely that of whether or not the existing custody and surroundings of the child are such that it is the duty of the state, as parens patriae, to take over its custody and make it a ward of the state. Everett v. Barry, 127 Colo. 34, 252 P.2d 826 (1953); Foxgruber v. Hansen, 128 Colo. 511, 265 P.2d 233 (1953); Johnson v. Black, 137 Colo. 119, 322 P.2d 99 (1958); Wellbrink v. Walden, 142 Colo. 102, 349 P.2d 697 (1960).

If child found not dependent, action should be dismissed. If the child is found not dependent, then there is nothing further to be considered and the action should be dismissed. Peterson v. Schwartzmann, 116 Colo. 235, 179 P.2d 662 (1947); In re People in Interest of Murley, 124 Colo. 581, 239 P.2d 706 (1951).

Lacking transcript, evidence, order reversed. Where an order was entered declaring a child neglected and dependent, severing parental rights, and holding the child's grandfather in contempt of court for failure to deliver the child, but the court reporter certified that there had been no transcript made of any of the hearings prior to the one on the contempt violation, and since there was no evidence or showing that the home environment which the grandfather might provide for the child would be unsatisfactory, the judgment and orders of the trial court were reversed. C.B. v. People in Interest of J.T.B., 30 Colo. App. 269, 493 P.2d 691 (1971).

Under construction . . .